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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL
COCOA AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts a critical analysis of this effort to
obtain a solution to the problem of cocoa price instability
through a workable international cocoa agreement. In section
one, a brief review of world production and marketing of
cocoa is given as a background.
Section two is a brief historical review of the evolution of
the International Cocoa Agreement (ICA). The third section
discusses the main provisions for operating the agreement.
Section four presents an economic analysis of the likely impact of the cocoa price stabilization scheme embodied in
ICA, using simple demand and supply apparatus. The final
section concludes the paper with some observations about
the future of the agreement.

The world output of cocoa comes exclusively from the
less developed countries (LDCs) while its consumption is
concentrated in the developed or industrial countries of
Western Europe and the United States of America. The bulk
of the primary trade is in raw beans, although a rising proportion of exports is in the form of semi-processed products. A
distinct feature of the market for cocoa is the wide and rapid
swing in prices. This is believed by the major producing countries to constitute a problem to their planned development
activity which is partly financed by export earnings from
cocoa and other primary commodities. Earnings from cocoa
also constitute a major source of income to a sizeable number of peasant farmers producing cocoa in these countries. 1
In particular, the governments of these countries consider
fiscal revenues, obtained through taxes and other levies on
cocoa production and export, an important source of funds
to finance their operations. In order to eliminate disorderly
marketing associated with violent swings in cocoa prices,
these countries have persistently sought an international
agreement designed to achieve relative stability of cocoa
prices within a "reasonable" price range. It is also frequently
asserted that the consuming nations should benefit from the
orderly marketing of cocoa which price stability is hoped to
bring about.

Part I

WORLD PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF COCOA
Ghana, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Brazil produce close to 80 percent of world cocoa output. The United
States, Western Europe and Japan consume the bulk of this
output. In the sixteen years between 1961-62 crop season
and 1976-77 the world output of cocoa increased by 22.0
percent or 1.6 percent per annual. The pattern and degree of
fluctuation is indicated in Chart l and Table I. In the same
period, world consumption increased from 1.1 million to 1.5
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major producing countries is under the control of the government through commodity marketing boards. In Ghana,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Jamaica, cocoa is shipped and
marketed by statutory marketing boards which purchase the
entire output at predetermined fixed prices and collect taxes
and other levies on the produce. In these countries the price
paid to producers is fixed by the government usually well
below the world market price with a view to accumulating
surplus funds- to be used in cushioning farmers' income in
lean years. This administered pricing of cocoa in the domestic market is said to isolate the farmer from the wide variation in world prices and thereby stabilize his income over a
planning horizon. As matters turned out, such marketing
board reserves were actually used to finan ce government
capital expenditures contrary to the stated purpose. This fiscal role of commodity marketing boards proved very important in LDCs and may in part explain their enthusiasm in
promoting international commodity agreements aimed at
stabilizing prices and the revenue generated.
Private firms undertake the international marketing of
cocoa and its distribution within the main consuming countries. These firms are either dealers who carry stocks to meet
the needs of manufacturers or manufacturers who purchase
cocoa directly from the producing countries. The main harvest season for Western African and Brazilian cocoa falls in
late fall and early winter which means that purchases in the
consuming countries must be made in advance of production
by the manufacturer. Much of the trading in cocoa takes
place in the futures market. Price quotations in the main
futures markets are considered accurate indicators of the
price level for most of the traded cocoa. Prices are determined mainly in the futures markets for New York and
London. (See Table 3.)
Table 4 reports recent data on world supply and demand
for cocoa which indicate that cocoa prices are determined
not only by current output or export but also by stockpiles
and the level of seasonal grinding. Producing countries normally dispose of all exportable supplies while stocks between

TABLE 1
WORLD COCOA PRODUCTION IN THOUSANDS OF
METRIC TONS AND THE FLUCTUATIONS AS A
PERCENT OF BASE YEAR 1961-62 PRODUCTION

Year

Production

% Fluctuation in

('000 Tons)

Production

1123
1162
1238
1490
1219
1336
1349
1237
1433
1380
1572
1399
1447
1544
1510

1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76

3
10

10
32
10
18
20
10
28
23
40
24
29
37
34

Source: Adapted from FAQ Commodity Year Book 1971 ,
pp. 100 and ex tended to the most recent period by the author.
million tons- representing a growth of 26.4 percent or an
annual average of 2.7 percent (see Table 2).
Cocoa price is subject to wide and irregular fluctuations.
According to an IMF study (1973), cocoa trade is one of the
most unstable commodities ih the export trade of developing
countries. 2 Using a fluctuation index based on the average
annual deviations from the long-term trend, they found
cocoa to be the most unstable of eight core export commodities, with a rating of 20 compared with 12 and IO for
sugar and coffee, respectively. The marketing of cocoa in the
TABLE 2
DATA ON WORLD COCOA ECONOMY

('000 metric tonnes unless otherwise stated)
Year 1

1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-7 0
1970-7 1
1971-72
1972-73
1973-74
1974-75
1975-76 3
1976-77 2

Production Export Consump- Stockpile
tion
(l)

(2)

(3)

1131
1158
1202
1490
1219
1336
1352
1236
1424
1493
1572
1399
1447
1544
1510
1370

1018
1020
1187
1204
1108
1082
1057
999
1119
1188
1235
1088
1160

1107
1146
1180
1179
1318
1367
1366
1390
1353
1357
1438
1566
1557
1477
1444
1504

NA

NA
NA

p nee
. 4

(4)
465
489
487

NA
NA
NA
581
572
4 33
498
565

NA
393
322
4 35
435

(5)
22.6
21.0
25.3
23.4
17.2
24.6
28.8
34.4
45.8
34.1
26.8
32.2
63.6
98.2
75.9
109.2

TABLE 3
PRICES OF INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE (A?I/NUAL)

Period
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

Source: Gill and Duffus and Bureau of Labor Statistics
1. Crop yean are for the 12 months Oct. I to
Sept. 30.
2. Forecast
3. Preliminary
4. Average spot cocoa bean price (ACCRA) in New
York in cents per pound.

New York
Spot Ghana 1
17.3
24.4
29.1
34.4
45.5
34.2
26.8
32.3
64.5

Futures2
U.S. Cents/lb.
16.l
23.0
26.3
31.5
39.5
29.7
24.0
38.6

Source: Adapted from Cocoa Statistics, Vol. 16, Oct. 1973,
F.A.0. Rome.
1
The New York Spot Ghana prices are exwarehouse and are fixed
daily by official committees.
2
Average of the daily price of the nearest three ruture trading
months on the New York Cocoa Exchange at noon.
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TABLE 4
WORLD COCOA SUPPLY AND DEMAND

(metric tons 'OOO's)
Crop Year1

Stocks
Oct. 1

Net World
Crop 2

Total
Availability

Seasonal

aosing Stock

581
572
433
498
565
617
393
322
435
435

1320
1230
1421
1483
1566
1384
1433
1529
1495
1356

1901
1802
1854
1981
2131
2001
1826
1851
1930
1791

1384
1369
1356
1416
1516
1605
1504
1416
1495
1437

517
433
498
565
615
396
322
435
435
354

1967-8
1968-9 5
1969-70
1970-1
1971-2
1972-3
1973-4
1974-5
1975-6 3
1976-74

Stock Change

- 64
- 139
+ 65
+ 67
+ 50
- 221
- 71
+113
0
- 81

Source: Gill and Duffus, Ltd.
1
Crop year season is Oct.-Sept.
2
Obtained by adjusting the gross world crop for I% loss in weight
3
Preliminary
4
Forecast
5
Data prior to 1968-9 are in thousands of long tons: source: Gill and Duffus, Ltd.

TABLE 5
COCOA PRICE CHANGES 1954 TO 1965
Monthly Average
High
U.S. Cents/lb.
First decline 1954-56
1954
1955
1956
Recovery 1957-1958
1957
1958
Second Decline 1959-62
1959
1960
1961
1962
Recovery

1963
1963

Third Decline 1964-65
1964
1965

Low
U.S. Cents/lb.

Annual Average
U.S. Cents/lb.

68.9 (July)
49.5 (Jan)
29.5 (Jan)

47.1 (Oct)
32.6 (Aug)
25.8 (April)

57.8
37.5
27.3

41.6 (Nov)
48.9 {June)

22.5 (March)
38.8 (Oct)

30.6
44.3

38.7 (March)
30.0 (Jan)
26.2 (Dec)
23.0 (Jan)

31.4 (Dec)
25.6 (Dec)
20.6 (March)
20.1 (Feb)

36.6
28.4
22.6
21.0

28.1 (May)

22.9 (Jan)

25.3

25.7 (Jan)
23.0 (Jan)

22.2 (April)
12.2 (July)

23.4
17.6

Note: This table uses calendar years as a basis rather than crop years (October-September)
Classification is based on the average annual figures.
Source- Journal of World Trade law Vol. 2. 1968, pp. 528.

years are held largely by manufactu rers in importing countries. As a result seasonal variations in crops h ave had a greater impact on price formation than they might have been had
producers withheld some supplies between cocoa seasons.
For instance, in 1964-65 a world record production level
caused prices to fall to exceptionally low levels in 1965 -66.
Most countries reacted eithe r by curtailing production or by
abandoning planned improvements. (See Table 5 and Chart l
for some indication of fluctuations in cocoa prices.) In general, prices of cocoa are said to vary inversely with the level
of stocks held. To sum up, the wide variations in world

supply coupled with a relatively inelastic demand cause the
price of cocoa to be more unstable than that of almost any
other commodity exported by the LDCs.

Part II

THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL COCOA AGREEMENT {ICA)
The rise of international commo dity agreements may be
viewed within the overall perspective of the New International Economic Order {NIEO), a course championed by the
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LDCs. The NIEO idea which surfaced at the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I, 1964),
represents an expression of the desire of the LDCs to exercise
increasing participation in the forces shaping their economy.
It is concerned with means to obtain broadly defined objectives of which commodity agreement forms an important
aspect.3 As shown in the analysis of the preceding section,
cocoa is produced in the LDCs and consumed in the industrialized countries. Furthermore, the forces determining its
world price may be largely traceable to middlemen speculative activities in the consuming countries. It is therefore not
surprising that cocoa should be considered one of the candidates for an internatio~al agreement designed to ensure that
the actors on both sides of the market exercise a balance of
economic power.
After several years spanning over a decade of preparatory
work, the draft of ICA was finally adopted in October 1972
to cover a period of three years. It officially came into operation on June 30 , 1973 and was renewed with no major alterations in 1975. However, it may be pointed out here that it
has not had any operational experience to its record. Before
subjecting it to a critical analysis, it is illuminating to review
the activities and conferences which culminated in the agreement.
Three international conferences (1963, 1966 and 1967)
and a number of intensive consultations among interested
parties under the supervision of Prebisch (Secretary General
of UNCT AD) are worth noting. The search for an international cocoa agreement may actually be considered to have
started in I 956 when the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization established a cocoa study group composed
of producers and consumers. They met intermittently to discuss the possibility of a cocoa agreement to stabilize world
prices. Discussions subsequently moved to the sponsorship of
UNCTAD.
The first UNCTAD cocoa conference ( 1963) was convened to implement the recommendation of the FAO Study
Group, "to consider the international measures designed to
meet the special diffi culties which existed or were expected
to arise concerning cocoa and the preparation of an international agreement embodying international measures considered desirable." 4 The conference adjourned without reaching any agreement but set up a working party on prices and
quotas. From mid-1965 to early 1966 the working party held
four sessions and expressed strong optimism about the possibility of obtaining an international agreement at another
cocoa conference. The next international cocoa conference
met for a month (May 23-June 23, 1966) but failed to reach
agreement and called for more preparatory work. In a statement to the conference the Secretary General of UNCTAD
identified a number of factors constituting the stumbling
blocks in the way of agreement. 5 They were connected mainly with the determination of the size and operating guidelines
and finance of the buffer stock.
Following the conventional approach some people advocated a buffer stock that would intervene in the market in
a symmetrical way, i.e., sell cocoa from stock when current
price penetrates the ceiling and stockpile when price drops

below the floor. The alternative view was to maintain a
buffer stock as a reserve stock and intervene asymmetrically
by buying the surplus cocoa in the hands of the producers at
the end of a crop season in which the market price was above
the ceiling. The second problem that was still to be resolved
was the need to set up a permanent arrangement to ensure a
steady flow of earnings to operate buffer stock and finance
storage expenses. Thirdly, the task of setting up an appropriate band of fluctuation for cocoa prices proved, not unexpectedly, problematic. Some suggested fixing the range for
the quota year while others wanted the range to operate for
the first three years before adj ustment. Suggestions in this
connection also included using the method of the coffee
agreement which does not have a fixed range but relies on
preventing price from falling below a certain level. There was
also the debate as to whether sales or export quotas should
be used in the stabilization arrangement.
To pursue the resolution of these problems the Secretary
General oflJNCT AD arranged a series of multilateral consultations in which he obtained the consent of fourteen countries
to adopt a memorandum of agreement concerning prices or
other important matters including the reconvention of cocoa
conference. The November 1967 cocoa conference met and
adjourned without securing any agreement. Between 1968
and 1969 two important meetings carried on the efforts at
securing ICA. A Cocoa Consultative Group met to consider
the outstanding issues of the draft (June 1968). This was
followed by a meeting of a Technical Preparatory Committee
(1969) to review certain articles of the draft agreement. Further progress was made in 1970-7 1 through series o f consultative group meetings to secure agreement on a number of
important issues including a proposal to appoint a negotiating committee to prepare a draft of ICA for adoption at
the next conference. The 1972 conference was first convened
in March but could only establish a negotiating committee to
seek to resolve the divergences of views on oi!tstanding issues
and produce an agreed draft texts of the relevant articles to
be presented to the reconvened conference.4 The conference
reconvened in September and adopted in October the texts
of the first ICA covering a period or' three years. The agreement was renewed with minor modifications in 1975.

Part DI
THE MAIN ECONOMIC PROVISIONS OF ICA
Objectives:
The objectives of the Agreement a re stated as follows: 6
(a) To alleviate serious economic difficulties which
would persist if adjustment between the production
and consumption of cocoa cannot be effected by normal market forces alone as rapidly as circumstances
require ;

(b) to prevent excessive fluctuations in the price of
cocoa which affect adversely the long-term interests of
both producers and consumers;
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(c) to make arrangements which will help stabilize and
increase the export earnings from cocoa of producing
countries thereby helping to provide such countries
with resources for accelerated economic growth and
social development, while at the same time taking into
account the interests of consumers in importing
countries;

Both the 1972 and 197S agreements established a buffer
stock capacity of 250,000 tons of cocoa beans to be operated by a buffer stock manager (BSM) in accordance with
rules established by the ICC. Buffer stock purchases are to be
made only from producing countries subject to export
quotas. Any reduction in producer countries export quotas is
to be taken up by BSM.
Under the agreement, an indicator price designed to play
an important role in the operation of the buffer stock and in
the determination of annual export quotas was defined to
equal the average daily prices* recorded for a period of IS
consecutive market days. The price range for cocoa bean
under the 1972 Agreement was U.S. 23¢-32¢ per lb. This was
revised to the range of U.S. 39¢-55¢ per lb. in the 197S
Agreement. These prices were subject to revision either
annually or when "upheavals in the internatio nal economic
and monetary situation" warranted it. Such revisions are to
be based on the trend of cocoa prices, consumption, production, stockpiles or other relevant factors.
Rules for operating the annual export quotas as well as
the buffer stock are tied to specified relationships between
the indicator price, and the floor and ceiling prices in operation at the given point in time. (See Appendix I for illustration of the formulae using the price range in the 197S ICA.)
Following the rules, the export quota is either left unchanged, or slightly reduced or suspended depending upon
whether the indicator price is in the middle of the price
range , or closer to the floor or to the ceiling, respectively.
The clear indication is that quotas are automatically suspended when the price lies above the ceiling. The guidelines
for operating the buffer stock requires the manager to buy
cocoa beans when the indicator price is close to or below the
floor price and sell when prices are fluctuating around the
ceiling.

( d) to assure adequate su pplies at reasonable prices,
equitable to producers and consumers; and
(e) to facilitate expansion of consumption and, if
necessary, and insofar as possible, an adjustment of
production, so as to secure an equilibrium in the long
term between supply and demand.
Although these objectives are highly general and in many
respects vague, they clearly indicate a belief in the imperfect
market structure for cocoa, coupled with a religious faith in
the power of price and income stabilization scheme to work
economic miracles for the producers as well as consumers.
Like the tin, and other similar agreements, the cocoa agreement relies on the use of two primary policy instruments- a
buffer stock arrangement and an export quotas system. To
operate the buffer stock, a price range , within which prices
may fluctuate freely without any intervention with the
market forces, was established.
The Agreement provides for the se tting of basic quotas for
the contracting exporting members. A member's basic quota
is proportional to its annual average share of the group average production taken over the preceding five crop years.
Members producing less than 10,000 tons of bulk cocoa are
not subject to quotas. An International Cocoa Council (ICC)
established under the Agreement is charged with the responsibility for determining the annual export quotas for the
nine major producers taking into account each member's
basic quota, and the estimate of world demand. The export
quotas are set ~ith the aim of maintaining price fluctuation
within the agreed band. They are proportional to the basic
quotas. (See Table 6 for the basic quotas allocations under
the 1972 and 197S Agreements.)

Part IV
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF
PRICE STABILIZATION
This section gives a simple and general theoretical
economic analysis of the price stabilization scheme embodied
in the ICA and similar arrangements. 7 The traditional
approach generally regards the market for internationally
traded primary commodities as approximating pure competition in which both producers and consumers are price takers.
The neoclassical comparative static economic framework has
demonstrated that pareto efficient allocation of resources is
best guaranteed in a world characterized by perfect competition. Following such a framework it could be demonstrated
that in a world with the correct initial distribution of assets
for a given social welfare function with easy entry, absence
of externalities and uncertainty, and pure competition everywhere, pure competition in international commodity markets

TABLE 6
ALLOCATION OF BASIC QUOTAS
1972 Agreement
Production
Exporting Countries (000 Tons)
Ghana
Nigeria
Ivory Coast
Brazil
Cameroon
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Togo
Mexico
Total

1975 Agreement

Basic
Production
Basic
Quotas % (000 tons) Quotas %

580.9
307.8
224.0
200.6
126.0
47.0
38.7
28.0
27.0

36.7
19.5
14.2
12.7
8.0
3.0
2.4
1.8
1.7

1580.0

100.0

409.8
247.7
196.3
189.7 t
112.0
37.1
27.3
23.1
19.6
1262.6

32.5
19.6
15.5
15.0
8.9
2.9
2.2
l.8
l.6
100.0

, *Daily price is defined as average taken daily of the quotations for
cocoa beans of the nearest three active future trading months on the
NY Cocoa Exchange at noon and London Cocoa Terminal Market at
closing time.

Source: UN Conference o n Trade and Development, UN Cocoa
Conference, I 972, I 975
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FIGURE 2
(Elastic curves with shock
from supply shifts)

results in maximization of that social welfare function. It
requires only a little stretch of the imagination to realize that
the reality is far from being replicated by such hypothetical
equilibrium framework. If we take into consideration the
speculative activities of private middlemen, marketing boards
or other quasi-government agencies, it may be difficult to
treat the world cocoa market with a perfectly competitive
model. Thus, at least, in principle it may be easy to justify
some intervention in the world market for cocoa. The theory
of the "second best" or "third best" may be summoned to
support the need for commodity agreements to regulate the
marketing of the core primary commodities traded internationally. The analysis that follows is designed to shed light
on the two interrelated questions, namely, (a) What implication does price stabilization have for the export earnings of
the producing countries? and (b) Who gains from price
stabilization?
ln response to the first question, it can be demonstrated
that under certain conditions, the impact of price stabilization programs suggest a tradeoff between t_he level and the
stability in revenue, but this is by no means the only possibility.
Consider Figures 1-3 below. Figures 1 and 2 deal with a
situation where both supply and demand curves are elastic.

Price

o auant1ty
.

FIGURE 1
(Elastic supply and demand curves
but shock from demand shift)

Q ,
s

Figure indicates that stabilization of prices at PO raises average revenue
but destabilizes it.

Price
When S 1 produce rs' revenue is P I a,
When S 1 producers' revenue is P1 0

1

without stabilization.
With stabilization at P 0 , revenue is PO 0 0 and when S1 , BSM sells
as.a• and buys a , 0 0 when S 1 ; producers sell P O 0 0 and gets
5
(a 0 0 51 )P from selling to buffer stock when S 1 . His average revenue
from stabilization is

I(00s,)PO

+ (0052 IP OJ /2

> ((Oal )Pl + (00, IP 1 )/ 2

and also fluctuates more.

0 .___ __ _ _ __,__ _.L..L...L...,,1.:1..L..a..............___
Quantity

_ . __

In one, the source of price swing is demand sh ift and illustrates the case where price stabilization results in stable but
lower average income for the producing countries. In Figure
2, price fluctuation is assumed to be associated with changes
in supply curves and shows that buffer stock operation could
destabilize producer's income while at the same time yield a
higher average income than in the absence of such intervention. Figure 3 models a situation of zero-elastic supply confronting inelastic demand and indicates that price stabilization raises revenue as well as stabilizes it.
The main lesson from ~he above analysis is that the impact of stabilization on producing countries' revenue cannot

___,

as ,

To stabilize at PO BSM buys 0 5 ,0 0 when D I and sells 0 5 20 0 w hen D 1

be settled on theoretical grounds. For instance, if producers

gain
{from }

Price stabilization

are sufficiently risk averse, and supply is highly inelastic,
then they are better off with price stabilization than without
it. Thus the issue is an empirical one and depends largely on
the size of the relevant elasticities. As pointed out by
Behrman "without empirical knowledge concerning long-run
movements, the shapes of the [demand and supply) curves,
risk aversion , the demand and supply elasticities of price

loss

>

~ = stabilization lowers producers average revenue

Average revenue witho ut price stabilization is (P 1 0

Revenue from stabilization PO 0

0

(P I

a,

1

+ P 2 a 2 1/ 2

+ P 2 0 2 I I 2 > PO 0 0
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FIGU RE 3
(Zer o elastic supply and inelastic demand
with sho ck from supply shift)
Price

FIGURE 4
Gains and Losses Fro m Price Stabilization
(shifts in Inelastic Supply Curve Only)

So

Price

F

A

0 .___ _ _ _ _ _ _

L . __ __.___ __ _ j_ _ __

__J

Quantity
Q

0 · - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - ~ - -~ ~ - - ~

shape o( the demand and supply curves which makes the
issue again basically an empirical one.
A world bank simulation experiment, using linear supply ,
demand and additive disturbance assumptions found stabilization would lose LDC's export revenue across a large spectrum of products with the exception of cocoa, coffee, jute
and wool where revenue ga ins are indicated. 8 But Behrman's
buffer stock simulation of 13 UNCTAD commodities show
substantial increases in producer revenues for all commodities except sisal and tin. He ~id not find any support for the
hypothesized reven ue instability from price stabilization.

Quantity

Stabilization income P O 0

0

Average income, no stabilization is (00 1 P I E 1 + 001 E 1 P1

)

12 < 0O0 E 0 P0
- Stabilization raises revenue as well as stabilizes.

responsiveness, the causes of shifts, whether the movements
in supply and demand curves are additive or multiplicative,
etc., we cannot state with assurance what the impacts of
stabilization are. " 7
The question who gains from price stabilization is related
to the one examined above. The simplest approach focuses
on producers' and consumers' surpluses and the financial
gains from operating a buffer stock. Figure 4 illustrates a
simple case where buffer stock operation is assumed to have
no storage cost.
When supply curve shifts to OI buffer stocks are accumulated. Consumers lose by paying P0 instead of the lower P 1 ;
this amounts to area A+ B + C. Producers gain area A+ B +
C + D. Buffer stock pays fo r area C + D + E. Overall result
(loss) is area C + E. When the supply curve shifts into 0 2 ,
stocks are sold at P0 • Consumers gain area F + G. The producer loses area F. The financial flow to the buffer stock is
H + B. The total benefit is G + G + H. Assuming shifts in the
supply curve to 0 1 and 0 2 are equally likely. The total benefit to each of the group is the sum of those obtained from
buffer stock operation with supply at 0 1 and 0 2 • For consumers, the sum is F + G - A - B - C. For producers the sum
is A+ B + C + D - F. For the buffer stock, the sum is B + H
- C - D - E. The total benefit is represented by B + G + H C - E. Under these assumptions the sum for the buffer stock
is zero and the overall sum is positive.
The conclusion which appears obvious from the above
discussion is that producer's benefit depends on the exact

Part V

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the world cocoa agreement is in its sixth year of
existence, it has no operational experience on which one can
base an analysis of its impact on the volume and pattern of
production and trade. In the 1971-72 and 1972-73 cocoa
season, price fluctuation occurred largely within the band
and consequently no buffe r stock could be built up. Be tween
1973-74 and 1976-77 cocoa prices fluctuated within a range
far exceeding that set in the 1975 ICA, i.e., 67- 109 U.S.
cents per lb. compared with the specified range of 39- 55¢ per
lb. Therefore no intervention was feasible in the absence of a
buffer stock. Thus even though the agreement is being observed in principle it has absolutely no impact so far on
world cocoa trade.
With regard to the future of the arrangement, it is difficult to see what significant role the ICA can play in stabilizing cocoa prices although in p rinciple it could stabilize and
raise producers average income as the analysis in section four
indicated. Howeve r the evidence is far from conclusive. Commodity agreements, even if they succeed in stabilizing prices,
may not always result in a higher average income for the
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producers. And more importantly, the welfare effects on producers, consumers and the buffer stock management have
been shown to depend on unobservable elasticities of demand and supply. Under such circumstances an objective
evaluation of the likely impact of ICA is bound to be conjectural. As of now there appears no hope of building up a
buffer stock in the near future. The export quota would
remain under indefinite suspension as long as the recent
cocoa price strength is maintained. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the cocoa commodity scheme would
continue to exist on paper until a sizeable surplus emerges to
enable the buffer stock manager to acquire some stockpile
with which to initiate its operational life as the need arises.
The experience of the older commodity schemes cast doubt
on their effectiveness. The long drawn out period of evolution of ICA more than ever affirms the nontrivial and tedious
process of negotiating commodity agreements involving a
great deal of political compromise. If the gains are not so
obvious, then one might legitimately ask whether it is worthwhile to take such trouble. No satisfactory answer seems to
be forthcoming in response to the question what prices
should be defended by buffer shock operations. Costs may
differ substantially among the producers. The long run equilibrium price is operationally an elusive concept and hence
no price can be easily found to compel acceptance by all
members. There is an ever-present conflict between consumers and producers in the critical decision areas necessary
to draw up an operational and workable agreement. The
problem of enforcing compliance cannot by any means be
minimized. While I do not intend to sound condemnatory of
commodity agreements, the above observations are intended
to suggest that the case for commodity agreements appear
to require a case by case treatment and more importantly
that their rationale might be substantially noneconomic.

APPENDIX
Operating guidelines for quotas and buffer stock.

Price range under the 1975 ICA: 39-55 U.S.¢/lb.
QUOTAS
(1) IfPJ>45¢perlb.

}

• P1 = 45 - 47¢
and/or {< }47¢ per lb.
The X quota should remain unchanged.

(2) If PI> 42 U.S.¢/ lb.

{<} 45 U.S.¢/ lb.

}
•

PI= 45 -45¢

• X Quota should be .97 (initial allocation)

(3) If PI > 47¢/lb . i.e., even before the ceiling price is
reached • suspend X quota.
Buffer Stock Operation

(a) If PI= 39 - 42¢/lb.
• BSM buy cocoa beans up to .04 (X quota) at current
market price.
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(b) If PI < 39¢/lb. • BSM buy cocoa until P1t above Pm or
until stock capacity it reached, whichever is earlier.

REFERENCES
(c) If_P1 > 53¢/lb. }
i.e., P1 = 53 - 55¢
{< }55¢/lb.
• BSM sell .07 (X quota) until PJ rises above Pm by 14¢
or stock is exhausted whichever is earlier.
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(d) If P1 > 55r// lb. i.e., P1 > Pm
• BSM sell cocoa until PJ = Pm or stock is exhausted,
whichever is earlier.
Legend

PJ a:: Indicator Price
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X quota = Export quota
Pm= Ceiling Price
BSM = Buffer Stock Manager
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